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PANACEA OR PANDORA'S BOX: THE "TWO
SCHOOLS OF MEDICAL THOUGHT" DOCTRINE
AFTER JONES v. CHIDESTER,
610 A.2d 964 (Pa. 1992)
In negligence actions alleging improper medical treatment, plaintiffs
must show that the physician's failure to administer reasonable treat-
ment proximately caused their injury.' Negligence law looks to the
customs of the medical profession in an effort to define reasonable
treatment.2 Often, however, medical experts differ as to what consti-
1. For cases dealing with the reasonableness standard, see, eg., Campbell v. United
States, 904 F.2d 1188, 1193 (7th Cir. 1990) (affirming a finding that a vascular surgeon
acted reasonably when he performed carotid surgery to try to prevent patient's stroke);
Chumbler v. McClure, 505 F.2d 489, 493 (6th Cir. 1974) (upholding a decision that
found that a physician acted reasonably when he prescribed a specific drug for patient's
cerebral vascular insufficiency); MacDonald v. United States, 767 F. Supp. 1295, 1309
(M.D. Pa. 1991) (holding a surgeon's actions reasonable when he conducted arterial
bypass surgery to correct blockage in patient's left calf); Estate of Smith v. Lerner, 387
N.W.2d 576, 583 (Iowa 1986) (affirming a verdict that the physician acted reasonably
when he administered a drug designed to prevent patient's impending heart attack);
Brannan v. Lankenau Hosp., 417 A.2d 196, 201 (Pa. 1980) (reversing trial court's ruling
of nonsuit in favor of physicians who unreasonably delayed treating patient with
antibiotics).
2. Jack R. Bierig et al., Practice Parameters: Malpractice Liability Considerations
for Physicians, in LEGAL MEDICINE 1991 207, 213 (Cyril H. Wecht ed., 1992). See,
e.g., Chumbler, 505 F.2d at 492 (noting that "[d]eviation from accepted medical prac-
tic... is a prerequisite for maintenance of a medical malpractice suit"); MacDonald,
767 F. Supp. at 1307 (stating that a plaintiff must present an expert witness who will
testify that the physician's acts deviated from good and acceptable medical standards);
Brannan, 417 A.2d at 199 (providing that "appellant must introduce expert testimony
to show that appellee physicians' conduct varied from accepted medical practice");
GRAHAM DOUTHwArrE, JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON MEDICAL ISSUES 55 (4th ed. 1992)
("Ordinarily, unless a medical practitioner's negligence is so blatant and obvious as to
be a matter of common knowledge to any lay observer, proof of breach of duty by a
physician or surgeon must rest on the testimony of an expert witness qualified to state
what the particular standard of care required, and expert opinion that the treatment
accorded to the patient did not meet such a standard."). But see Helling v. Carey, 519
P.2d 981, 983 (Wash. 1974) (en banc) (reversing verdict for ophthalmologist and hold-
ing him negligent as a matter of law for his failure to give an eye pressure test to prevent
Washington University Open Scholarship
224 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 44:223
tutes reasonable treatment or care.3 In such cases, courts refuse to find
physicians liable for negligent treatment if, in using their best judg-
ment,4 the physicians adhered to one of two or more alternative treat-
ments recognized as acceptable in the profession.5 The test to
determine whether a physician's treatment falls under this "two
schools of thought" doctrine is unclear.6 In Jones v. Chidester,7 the
glaucoma, even though the defendant met the standard of care in the ophthalmology
profession).
To reduce medical malpractice costs, commentators have examined the possible de-
velopment of formally accepted medical practice parameters to replace the customary
standard of care in the medical profession. See, e.g., Bierig et al., supra, at 207; Joseph
H. King, Jr., In Search of a Standard of Care for the Medical Profession: The 'Accepted
Practice" Formula, 28 VAND. L. REv. 1212, 1238 (1975) (urging the adoption of an
"accepted practice" standard, focusing on the reasonable expectations of the medical
profession regarding how doctors should manage the care of patients).
3. See Leech v. Bralliar, 275 F. Supp. 897, 898-99 (D. Ariz. 1967) (noting physi-
cians' differing opinions on treating patient's whiplash injuries); Sims v. Callahan, 112
So.2d 776, 782-83 (Ala. 1959) (on performing cataract surgery); Rickett v. Hayes, 511
S.W.2d 187, 194 (Ark. 1974) (on removing teeth when performing surgery to repair a
fractured jaw); Estate of Smith v. Lerner, 387 N.W.2d 576, 580 (Iowa 1986) (on use of
drugs before patient's impending heart attack); Reid v. North Caddo Memorial Hosp.,
528 So.2d 653, 657-58 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (on the correct way to treat a human bite on
the hand); Haase v. Garfinkel, 418 S.W.2d 108, 114 (Mo. 1967) (on use of anticoagulant
drug for patients suffering from coronary artery disease); Maxwell v. Howell, 174 S.E.
553, 555 (W. Va. 1934) (on proper method to repair patient's broken leg); Holton v.
Burton, 222 N.W. 225, 228 (Wis. 1928) (on proper sling use to mend a separated
shoulder).
4. A physician is not negligent simply for an error in judgment. See Rickett v.
Hayes, 511 S.W.2d 187, 194 (Ark. 1974) (holding that "a physician who uses his own
best judgment cannot be convicted of negligence, even though it may afterward develop
that he was mistaken" (quoting Haase v. Garfinkel, 418 S.W.2d 108 (Mo. 1967)));
Duckworth v. Bennett, 181 A. 558, 559 (Pa. 1935) (holding that "[w]here the most that
the case discloses is an error of judgment on the surgeon's part, there is no liability").
5. Wasfi v. Chaddha, 588 A.2d 204, 209 (Conn. 1991). This doctrine is referred to
as the "two schools of thought" doctrine. See MacDonald v. United States, 767 F.
Supp. 1295, 1308 (M.D. Pa. 1991) (tracing the history of the doctrine); see, e.g., Young
v. United States, 574 F. Supp. 571, 581 (D. Del. 1983) (holding that a treatment recog-
nized in the medical profession as one of two or more proper alternative treatments is a
complete defense to a negligence suit); Sims, 112 So.2d at 783 (same); Rickett, 511
S.W.2d at 195 (same); Joy v. Chan, 377 N.E.2d 670, 673 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978) (same);
Estate of Smith, 387 N.W.2d at 581 (same); Reid, 528 So.2d at 658 (same); Haase, 418
S.W.2d at 114 (same); McGuire v. Rix, 225 N.W. 120, 123 (Neb. 1929) (same); Scheuler
v. Strelinger, 204 A.2d 577, 585 (N.J. 1964) (same); Maxwell, 174 S.E. at 555 (same);
Holton, 222 N.W. at 228 (same).
6. Currently, there are three prevailing doctrines as to what qualifies a medical
treatment as a school of thought. See infra notes 25, 32, 52 and 57 and accompanying
text for discussions of the "considerable number," "respectable minority" (also called
"reputable, respected") and "reasonable and prudent doctor" standards.
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Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a physician's treatment must be
supported by a "considerable number" of respected and recognized
medical experts for the physician to be protected from negligence lia-
bility under the "two schools of thought" doctrine.'
In Chidester, the plaintiff commenced a medical malpractice action
against the defendant physician, alleging that the defendant's use of a
tourniquet during surgery deviated from proper medical standards and
proximately caused the plaintiff's leg injuries.9 The jury returned a
verdict in favor of the defendant.'0 The plaintiff moved for a new trial
on the grounds that the court's jury instruction on the "two schools of
thought" doctrine constituted reversible error because it omitted the
phrase "considerable number."'1 The trial court disagreed, holding
that the jury instruction correctly articulated the "two schools of
thought" doctrine.' 2 The superior court affirmed the lower court's
7. 610 A.2d 964 (Pa. 1992).
8. Id. at 969. In effect, the Chidester court redefined the "two schools of thought"
doctrine. See infra note 57 for the court's new definition.
9. Chidester, 610 A.2d at 966. Dr. Chidester performed orthopedic surgery to re-
pair Billy Jones' broken leg. Id. at 965. To establish a "bloodless field" for the surgery,
Dr. Chidester utilized a pneumatic tourniquet that he inflated and deflated at intermit-
tent intervals. Id. During follow-up treatment, Jones began to exhibit symptoms of
"drop foot" and difficulties with plantar flexion (defined as turning the foot or toes
downward). Appellee's Brief at 4, Jones v. Chidester, 610 A.2d 964 (Pa. 1992) (No.
209). Dr. Chidester referred Jones to a neurosurgeon who concluded that Jones suf-
fered permanent nerve damage behind his right knee. Id.
10. Chidester, 610 A.2d at 966.
11. Id. The trial court gave the following instruction to the jury:
Ladies and gentlemen, I instruct you upon this additional principle of law known
as the two schools of thought doctrine. This principle provides that it is improper
for a jury to be required to decide which of two schools of thought as to proper
procedure should have been followed in this case, when both schools have their
respective and respected advocates and followers in the medical profession.
In essence, then, a jury of lay persons is not to be put in a position of choosing
one respected body of medical opinion over another when each has a reasonable
following among the members of the medical community.
Thus, under the two schools of thought doctrine, a physician in the position of
Dr. Chidester will not be held liable to a plaintiff merely for exercising his judg-
ment in applying the course of treatment supported by a reputable and respected
body of medical experts, even if another body of medical experts' opinion would
favor a different course of treatment.
Id.
12. Jones v. Chidester, No. 89-345, slip op. at 8 (Chester County Pa. Aug. 4, 1989).
The Court of Common Pleas asserted that "the two schools of thought doctrine applies
only to a school of thought advocated by a 'considerable number' of reputable and
respected physicians." Id. at 6. Yet, the court's charge to the jury provided that a
19931
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jury instruction that a physician would be excused from liability if
"reputable, respected and reasonable" medical experts supported his
treatment.13 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed and re-
manded,14 and held that a physician would escape liability if his medi-
cal treatment received the support of a "considerable number" of
medical experts.15
Traditionally, courts would not find a physician's treatment to be
negligent if the doctor adhered to the standard of care followed in the
particular locality or in similar communities.16 Gradually, however,
many jurisdictions abandoned the "locality rule" and adopted a na-
tional standard of care. 7 Despite the jurisdictional trend toward a
more universal standard of care, courts have held that physicians may
digress from widely recognized methods of treatment and still avoid
malpractice liability by treating patients in accordance with other le-
gally acceptable schools of thought."8 Under the "two schools of
thought" doctrine, physicians are not subject to liability if their treat-
physician would be exonerated if his treatment were "supported by a reputable and
respected body of medical experts." Id. at 8.
13. Jones v. Chidester, 579 A.2d 423 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
14. Chidester, 610 A.2d at 969.
15. Id. at 967. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined that, based on the
facts of each case, a jury would determine how many recognized and respected medical
experts were necessary to create another "school of thought." Id.
16. See, e.g., McHugh v. Audet, 72 F. Supp. 394, 399 (M.D. Pa. 1947) (explaining a
physician's duty to possess the learning and skill of the ordinary physician in the local-
ity); Meier v. Ross Gen. Hosp., 445 P.2d 519, 526 (Cal. 1968) (same); Force v. Greg-
ory, 27 A. 1116, 1116 (Conn. 1893) (same); Walkenhorst v. Kesler, 67 P.2d 654, 663
(Utah 1937) (same).
17. See Bierig et aL, supra note 2, at 213. See generally Bobby Gibson, Note, Na-
tional Standard of Care - A New Dimension of the Locality Rule, 36 ARK. L. REV. 161
(1983) (concluding that a nonlocal specialist can testify that a local specialist breached
the national standard of care); Sherry A. Scott, Comment, Locality Rule Abandoned In
Alabama and Family Practitioner Held To National Medical Neighborhood Standard of
Care, May v. Moore, 14 CuMB. L. REV. 251 (1984) (analyzing the court's holding that
general practitioners as well as specialists must adhere to national medical standards).
But cf. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323 (1982) (holding a professional immune
from liability if budgetary constraints caused the professional to digress from the ac-
cepted standard of care). Recent case law stresses that the courts consider the resources
available to the physician when determining compliance with the national standard.
Mark A. Hall, The Malpractice Standard in an Era of Cost Containment, 17 LAW,
MEDICINE & HEALTH CARE 347, 349-50 (1989).
18. See supra note 5 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "two schools of
thought" doctrine.
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ment adheres to an accepted school of medical thought. 19 Courts dif-
fer, however, as to when a specific medical treatment becomes an
acceptable school of thought.2°
The earliest Pennsylvania case to introduce the "two schools of
thought" doctrine was Remley v. Plummer.21 In Remley, a steel
worker accidentally suffered a partial amputation of his left index fin-
ger. 22 During an operation to repair the finger, the patient died.23 The
decedent's mother sued the physician for medical malpractice and al-
leged that the defendant's improper use of anesthetics during the oper-
ation proximately caused her son's death.24 The court reasoned that
the defendant did not act negligently if a "considerable number" of
colleagues agreed with his use of anesthetics.25 Many Pennsylvania
cases followed Remley and applied the "considerable number" stan-
dard when qualifying a treatment as a school of thought.26
In Tobash v. Jones,27 however, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court al-
tered the definition of the "two schools of thought" doctrine.28 Tobash
involved the issue of whether the defendant physician's excision of
plaintiff's spinal cord tissue for biopsy purposes constituted negligent
treatment.2 9 The trial court's jury instruction provided that the physi-
19. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text for a discussion of negligence
liability.
20. See infra note 48 for a list of illustrative cases.
21. 79 Pa. Super. 117 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1922).
22. Id. at 119.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 119-20. Medical experts differed as to whether medical personnel should
have administered a heart stimulant to the patient and whether chloroform should have
been substituted for ether as an anesthetic in the midst of the operation. Id. at 120.
25. Id. at 122. In its opinion, the Remley court later substituted "majority of breth-
ren who testified" and "large proportion of their professional associates" for "considera-
ble number." Id. at 123-24.
26. See, eg., McHugh v. Audet, 72 F. Supp. 394, 400 (M.D. Pa. 1947) (asserting
that a method or form of treatment must be supported by a "considerable number" of
medical experts); Brannan v. Lankenau Hosp., 417 A.2d 196, 200 (Pa. 1980) (same);
Duckworth v. Bennett, 181 A. 558, 559 (Pa. 1935) (same); D'Angelis v. Zakuto, 556
A.2d 431, 435-36 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (Kelly, J., concurring) (same); Hodgson v. Bige-
low, 7 A.2d 338, 347 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1939).
27. 213 A.2d 588 (Pa. 1965).
28. Id. at 593. The plaintiff failed to challenge the definition of the "two schools of
thought" doctrine. Id. at 592. Instead, the plaintiff contended that the doctrine did not
apply to the facts and issues of the case. Id.
29. Id. at 593. Tobash suffered intense and frequent backaches when he came
under the care of Dr. Jones. Id. at 588. After discovering a partial block of Tobash's
1993]
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cian should be exculpated of any wrongdoing if "reputable, respectable
and reasonable medical experts" endorsed his surgical excision."0 The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's jury instruc-
tion.31 Thus, the court adopted the standard that a physician may not
be held negligent if "reputable, respected and reasonable medical ex-
perts" supported the doctor's treatment,32 but did not define how many
of such experts qualified as a school of thought.
Subsequently, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reaffirmed the "con-
siderable number" test in Brannan v. Lankenau Hospital.13 In Bran-
nan, expert testimony conflicted as to whether the defendants
negligently delayed the administration of antibiotics for the plaintiff's
perforated esophagus.34 The court held that in order for the "two
schools of thought" doctrine to apply, the physicians' treatment must
spinal cord, Dr. Jones performed surgery to alleviate the blockage and found the spinal
cord to be "quite abnormal." Id. Dr. Jones excised a section of nerve tissue for further
examination. Id.
30. Id. at 592. To support its holding, the court cited the following excerpt from
Remley:
The question actually passed upon by the jury was not whether the [two doctors] in
their handling of the case, had been guilty in not following a well-recognized and
established mode of treatment, but rather, which of two methods, both having their
respective advocates and followers of respectable authority, was the safer and bet-
ter from a surgical standpoint.
Id. at 593.
31. Id.
32. Other courts have also accepted the "reputable, respected" standard. See, e.g.,
Harrigan v. United States, 408 F. Supp. 177, 186 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (holding that a
method or form of treatment is not negligent when supported by reputable, respected
medical experts); Sinclair v. Block, 594 A.2d 750, 756 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (same);
Levine v. Rosen, 575 A.2d 579, 581 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (same).
The "reputable, respected" standard is also identified as the "respectable minority"
test. Telephone Interview with Nicholas P. Papadakos, Justice, Pennsylvania Supreme
Court (Sept. 2, 1992). See also Borja v. Phoenix Gen. Hosp., 727 P.2d 355, 357 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1986) (holding a physician not liable when his treatment garnered the ap-
proval of a respectable minority of physicians); Schwab v. Tolley, 345 So.2d 747, 753
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (same); Gruginski v. Lane, 30 P.2d 970, 971 (Wash. 1934)
(same).
33. 417 A.2d 196 (Pa. 1980).
34. Id. at 199. Brannan consented to an esophagoscopy to remove a piece of beef
that was obstructing his esophagus. Id. at 198. During surgery, a screw on the sur-
geon's forceps broke off in Brannan's esophagus, causing the forceps' pointed ends to
contact the walls of the esophagus. Id. Although the surgeon suspected that he may
have perforated Brannan's esophagus, neither he nor another physician prescribed an-
tibiotics for Brannan until 16 hours after surgery. Id. Brannan suffered an infection
that led to other complications and a subsequent meningeal stroke. Id.
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be supported by a "considerable number" of medical practitioners.35
The court reasoned that a "small respected body" of physicians did not
qualify as a "considerable number" of medical experts.36
More recently, however, the Pennsylvania Superior Court has ig-
nored the Brannan standard and has adopted the Tobash standard, in-
terpreting the "two schools of thought" doctrine as an absolute defense
when a physician's treatment receives the support of "reputable,
respected and reasonable" medical experts.37 In Furey v. Thomas Jef-
ferson University Hospital,38 expert testimony conflicted as to whether
the defendant's performance of surgery constituted an acceptable alter-
native to a more conservative antibiotic treatment. 39 The court applied
the "reputable, respected" standard of the "two schools of thought"
doctrine while inexplicably citing both Brannan and Tobash as author-
ity.' The court failed to distinguish between the "considerable
number" and "reputable, respected" standards discussed in Brannan.41
In D'Angelis v. Zakuto,42 expert testimony conflicted as to whether
the defendant physician properly diagnosed the plaintiffs' son's pneu-
monia.43 Because the medical experts differed on the proper diagnosis
and not the treatment, the court held that the lower court erred in
giving a jury instruction on the "two schools of thought" doctrine."
35. Id. at 200-01.
36. Id. at 201. Brannan's expert witness explained that the "great majority" of phy-
sicians would have administered antibiotics immediately if they perceived the possibility
that a patient sustained a perforated esophagus. Id.
37. See Sinclair v. Block, 594 A.2d 750, 756 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (holding that "a
doctor will not be liable for medical malpractice if he follows a course of treatment
supported by reputable, respected and reasonable medical experts"); Levine v. Rosen,
575 A.2d 579, 581 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (same); Trent v. Trotman, 508 A.2d 580, 584
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (same); Furey v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 472 A.2d 1083,
1089 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (same).
38. 472 A.2d 1083 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).
39. Id. at 1090. Plaintiff suffered from a bacterial infection which caused severe
abdominal pain. Id. at 1085. After preliminary tests, defendant performed exploratory
surgery to discover the cause of plaintiff's discomfort. Id. at 1086.
40. Id. at 1089. More recent Pennsylvania Superior Court decisions have cited
Furey when outlining the "two schools of thought" doctrine. See supra note 37 for
cases that have adopted Furey's definition.
41. Id. at 1089-91.
42. 556 A.2d 431 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).
43. Id. at 432. The defendant diagnosed the twenty-six month old boy with an
upper respiratory infection. Id. at 431. The boy died, and the autopsy revealed that he
had suffered from pneumonia. Id. at 432.
44. Id. at 433-34. Accord Morganstein v. House, 547 A.2d 1180, 1183 (Pa. Super.
1993]
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In a concurring opinion, Judge Kelly argued that the court gave an
incorrect jury instruction because it failed to use the "considerable
number" definition of the "two schools of thought" doctrine.45 Judge
Kelly recognized the "reputable, respected" standard as a more liberal
standard of care than that required by Pennsylvania law."
The above-referenced cases illustrate the difficulties Pennsylvania
has faced in its attempt to precisely define the "two schools of thought"
doctrine.47 By contrast, other states have not attempted to define the
standard by which to measure a "school of thought" with the same
level of specificity.48 Few states have addressed the "two schools of
Ct. 1988) (holding an instruction on the "two schools of thought" doctrine incorrect
where medical experts disagreed on the diagnosis of decedent's ailment).
45. D'Angelis, 556 A.2d at 435-36 (Kelly, J., concurring). Judge Kelly cited
Remley and Duckworth as authority. Id. at 435.
46. Id. at 436. See supra note 32 for Judge Papadakos' interpretation of this
standard.
47. See Michael P. Barrett, Pennsylvania's Two Schools of Medical Thought Rule,
THE BARRISTER (Pennsylvania Trial Lawyers Ass'n), Winter 1989-90 at 15-19 (tracing
the inconsistencies in Pennsylvania's law).
48. See, eg., Ward v. United States, 838 F.2d 182, 186 (6th Cir. 1988) ("supported
by other physicians in good standing"); O'Neill v. Kiledjian, 511 F.2d 511, 513 (6th Cir.
1975) ("when both alternatives have the support of a considerable body of competent
medical opinion in the community"); MacDonald v. United States, 767 F. Supp. 1295,
1308 (M.D. Pa. 1991) (citing both "considerable number" and "reputable, respectable,
and reasonable experts" standards); Young v. United States, 574 F. Supp. 571, 581 (D.
Del. 1983) ("recognized as a proper medical procedure"); Sims v. Callahan, 112 So.2d
776, 783 (Ala. 1959) ("[w]here there are various recognized methods of treatment");
Borja v. Phoenix Gen. Hosp., 727 P.2d 355, 357 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) ("respectable
minority"); Rickett v. Hayes, 511 S.W.2d 187, 194 (Ark. 1974) ("room for an honest
difference of opinion among competent physicians"); Meier v. Ross Gen. Hosp., 445
P.2d 519, 529 (Cal. 1968) ("one of alternative accepted methods of treatment, with
which other physicians [agree]"); Wasfi v. Chaddha, 588 A.2d 204, 209 (Conn. 1991)
("one of choice among competent physicians"); Schwab v. Tolley, 345 So.2d 747, 753
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) ("methods approved by others of their profession who are
reasonably skilled"); Newell v. Corres, 466 N.E.2d 1085, 1089 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984)
("[w]here alternative methods of treatment are shown to be proper"); Joy v. Chau, 377
N.E.2d 670, 673 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978) ("[when] more than one method of treatment is
recognized"); Estate of Smith v. Lerner, 387 N.W.2d 576, 581 (Iowa 1986) ("recognized
alternative course of action"); Reid v. North Caddo Memorial Hosp., 528 So.2d 653,
658 (La. Ct. App. 1988) ("acceptable method"); Downer v. Veilleux, 322 A.2d 82, 87
(Me. 1974) ("recognized course [ ] of treatment"); Ouellette v. Subak, 391 N.W.2d 810,
816 (Minn. 1986) ("accepted treatment"); Haase v. Garfinkel, 418 S.W.2d 108, 114
(Mo. 1967) ("room for an honest difference of opinion among competent physicians");
McGuire v. Rix, 225 N.W. 120, 123 (Neb. 1929) ("recognized methods"); Scheuler v.
Strelinger, 204 A.2d 577, 585 (N.J. 1964) ("still being fought in the halls of medical
schools and lectures"); Becker v. Hidalgo, 556 P.2d 35, 38 (N.M. 1976) ("recognized
standard"); Fallon v. Loree, 525 N.Y.S.2d 93, 93 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) ("one of sev-
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thought" doctrine in considerable depth.49
The Texas Supreme Court rejected both the "considerable number"
and "respectable minority" (or "reputable, respected") standards in
Hood v. Phillips.5" In Hood, the court articulated a new standard while
confronting the issue of whether a surgeon improperly treated an em-
physema patient by removing one of the carotid bodies from the pa-
tient's neck.51 The court held that a physician is free from liability if a
"reasonable and prudent doctor" would have treated the physician's
patient in the same manner under similar circumstances.52 In reaching
its holding, the court concluded that the "considerable number" and
"respectable minority" standards misleadingly quantify the standard
for malpractice.5"
Jones v. Chidester 54 provided the Pennsylvania Supreme Court with
the opportunity to clarify its definition of the "two schools of thought"
doctrine." The court rejected the "respectable minority" standard
eral acceptable techniques"); Walkenhorst v. Kesler, 67 P.2d 654, 668 (Utah 1937)
("treatment employed has the approval of at least a respectable portion of the profes-
sion"); Gruginski v. Lane, 30 P.2d 970, 971 (Wash. 1934) ("respectable minority");
Maxwell v. Howell, 174 S.E. 553, 554 (W. Va. 1934) ("approved method"); Holton v.
Burton, 222 N.W. 225, 228 (Wis. 1928) ("one of two accepted or recognized methods");
Smith v. Beard, 110 P.2d 260, 266 (Wyo. 1941) (citing both "considerable number" and
"respectable minority" standards).
49. Tennessee adopted the "considerable number" standard. Truan v. Smith, 578
S.W.2d 73, 76 (Tenn. 1979). But cf. Ward v. United States, 838 F.2d 182, 186 (6th Cir.
1988) (citing Truan but substituting "if he chooses a course of treatment supported by
other physicians in good standing" for the "considerable number" phraseology).
50. 554 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. 1977).
51. Id. at 162. A carotid body is a "receptor for chemical stimuli 'sensitive to the
concentration of carbon dioxide in the blood, and assist[s] in reflex control of respira-
tion."' Id. at 162 n.2. (quoting HENRY GRAY, F.R.S., ANATOMY OF THE HUMAN
BODY 895 (29th Am. ed. 1973)).
52. Id. at 165. The Texas Supreme Court defined the "reasonable and prudent doc-
tor" test as follows: "A physician who undertakes a mode or form of treatment which a
reasonable and prudent member of the medical profession would undertake under the
same or similar circumstances shall not be subject to liability for harm caused thereby
to the patient." Id. Accord Ellisa C. Huguley, Comment, Proving Negligent Deviation
From Established Medical Standards, 37 S.C. L. REv. 245 (1985) (discussing the rea-
sonable prudence of a physician as the issue in question under South Carolina law).
53. Hood, 554 S.W.2d at 165. Specifically, the Hood court explained that the two
standards "could convey to a jury the incorrect notion that the standard for malpractice
is to be determined by a poll of the medical profession." Id.
54. 610 A.2d 964 (Pa. 1992).
55. Id. at 965.
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adopted by the Pennsylvania Superior Court in earlier decisions.5 6 The
Chidester court concluded that a considerable number of reputable and
respected physicians must concur for a treatment to qualify as a
"school of thought.""7  The court reasoned that the "reputable and
respected" element insured the quality of a treatment, while the "con-
siderable number" requirement safeguarded the treatment's acceptabil-
ity within the medical profession.58 Because the "two schools of
thought" doctrine acts as an absolute defense, the court found the "re-
spectable minority" standard to be insutficient.5 9
In fixing the meaning of the "two schools of thought" doctrine, the
court did not attempt to numerically define what constitutes a "consid-
erable number" of medical professionals.6 Instead, the court placed
the burden of proving that a considerable number of practitioners sup-
port the doctor's course of treatment on the physician, who can meet
that burden using experts.61 Once the defendant presents expert wit-
nesses, the jury is to consider the testimony and determine whether a
"considerable number of physicians and recognized and respected ex-
perts in their field" support the physician's treatment.62
The Chidester court grappled with how to determine the creation of
a medical "school of thought."6" In reviewing prior case law, the court
mistakenly characterized the "reputable, respected" 6 or "respectable
56. Id. at 969 (implicitly overruling Sinclair v. Block, 594 A.2d 750, 756 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1991); Levine v. Rosen, 575 A.2d 579, 581 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990); Trent v. Trotman,
508 A.2d 580, 584 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986); Furey v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 472
A.2d 1083, 1089 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984)).
57. Chidester, 610 A.2d at 969. The court set forth the "two schools of thought"
doctrine as follows: "Where competent medical authority is divided, a physician will
not be held responsible if in the exercise of his judgment he followed a course of treat-
ment advocated by a considerable number of recognized and respected professionals in
his given area of expertise." Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. The court reasoned that the "reputable and respected" test merely required
a showing that there exists a "small minority" of physicians who agree with the prac-
tice. Because the test did not ensure the practice's general acceptance, the court felt it
improper. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. The court clarified that the physician's burden should not prove onerous.
Id.
62. Chidester, 610 A.2d at 969. In a concurring opinion, Justice Zappala opined
that it is a question of law for the trial judge to determine whether two schools of
medical thought exist. Id. at 970 (Zappala, J., concurring).
63. Id. at 965.
64. The court implied that the phrases "reputable, respected and reasonable medical
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol44/iss1/9
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minority' 6 5 standard as a qualitative standard.6 6 The court later im-
plied that the "reputable, respected" standard was too lenient because
physicians could exonerate themselves if they could find one respected
colleague to agree with their treatment of a patient.67 As such, the
court then correctly, though unintentionally, classified the "reputable,
respected medical experts" standard as a quantitative standard.6 8
Faced with deciding between two quantitative standards, the court rea-
soned that the "considerable number" standard more effectively en-
sured a treatment's quality by requiring the general approval of more
physicians. 69 Although the court did not attempt to define "considera-
ble number," juries in future Pennsylvania cases will face that
burden.70
The better-reasoned view is the qualitative "reasonable and prudent
doctor" standard articulated in Hood.71 The "reasonable and prudent
doctor" standard is preferable because it allows for the use of "experi-
mental" methods of treatment. 72 By quantifying medical acceptance,
the "considerable number" and "respectable minority" standards un-
fairly bias the jury against medical situations that demand experimen-
tation. The Hood standard properly focuses the issue on whether the
experts" and "respectable minority" were different labels for the same standard. Tele-
phone Interview with Nicholas P. Papadakos, Justice, Pennsylvania Supreme Court
(Sept. 2, 1992).
65. See supra note 32 & 64 for the usage of these two standards.
66. See supra note 53 and accompanying text for the Hood court's reasoning in
classifying the respectable minority standard as quantitative.
67. Telephone Interview with Nicholas P. Papadakos, Justice, Pennsylvania
Supreme Court (Sept. 2, 1992). See also supra note 59 for the court's reasoning. Cf.
Morganstein v. House, 547 A.2d 1180, 1183 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (holding a jury in-
struction to be erroneous where the jury could have construed that only the testimony
of one medical expert, agreeing with the defendant, triggered the use of the "two schools
of thought" doctrine); But cf. Newell v. Corres, 466 N.E.2d 1085 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984)
(introducing the "two schools of thought" doctrine where one doctor supported defend-
ant's treatment as adequate).
68. See supra note 53 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Hood court's
reasoning with respect to this classification.
69. Chidester, 610 A.2d at 969. Specifically, the court held that the "considerable
number" standard requires the adherence of more physicians "even if it does not rise to
the level of a majority." Id.
70. See supra notes 54-62 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Chidester
decision.
71. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text for the Hood court's analysis.
72. See Hood, 554 S.W.2d at 165 ("[P]hysicians should be allowed to experiment in
order that medical science can provide greater benefits for humankind.").
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physician acted appropriately under the circumstances.73 Therefore,
the "reasonable and prudent doctor" standard allows for more intellec-
tual flexibility without disregarding the quality concerns of the
Chidester court.
Within its ambit, the Chidester decision clarified the Pennsylvania
standard for malpractice.74 Nevertheless, the "considerable number"
standard it adopted perpetuates an oscillating quantitative definition of
the "two schools of thought" doctrine. 75 The Chidester decision quells
debate over the definition of the "two schools of thought" doctrine, but
unfortunately encourages a new debate over what constitutes a consid-
erable number of physicians.
Douglas Rader Brown*
73. The Hood court proffered the following factors for determining whether a physi-
cian acted prudently and reasonably: "the expertise of and means available to the phy-
sician-defendant, the health of the patient, and the state of medical knowledge." Hood,
554 S.W.2d at 165.
74. Chidester, 610 A.2d at 968-69.
75. See supra notes 53, 60-62 and accompanying text for a discussion of the quanti-
tative standard.
* J.D. 1994, Washington University.
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